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THE  STARTLING  DECLINE  in U.S. aggregate  labor  productivity  during 
the first  three  quarters  of 1979 (a 2.3 percent  decline  in the nonfarm  busi- 
ness sector  at an annual  rate) adds  new urgency  to the continuing  concern 
about U.S. productivity  behavior.  Several  important  recent  studies  have 
documented  a slowdown  in the secular  growth  rate of productivity  that 
has taken  place in two stages,  the first  beginning  after 1965 or 1966 and 
the second after 1973, and most studies  appear  to leave the causes of a 
large portion  of the deceleration  as an unresolved  puzzle.1  Does the ex- 
perience  of 1979 suggest  that a third  stage of the secular  slowdown  has 
begun, or is this recent  behavior  consistent  with previous  occurrences  at 
the same  stage  of the  business  cycle? 
Many studies  of the short-run  cyclical  behavior  of labor productivity 
have been by-products  of larger  studies  of secular  trends.  In the work of 
Perry and Nordhaus,  for instance,  a cyclical correction  was required  to 
construct  measures  of aggregate  "normal"  or "potential"  productivity  for 
studies  of long-term  trends  and  the sources  of shifts  in these  trends.2  This 
Note:  The author is grateful to the National Science Foundation for research 
support,  and to Jon F. Frye for his skilled assistance. 
1. See J. R. Norsworthy,  Michael J. Harper, and Kent Kunze, "The Slowdown in 
Productivity Growth: Analysis of Some Contributing  Factors," in this issue. They 
attribute 52 percent of the total slowdown in private business productivity to un- 
identified  "other  factors."  Other  recent studies are cited in the same paper. 
2.  George L. Perry, "Labor  Force Structure,  Potential Output,  and Productivity," 
BPEA, 3:1971, pp. 533-65; William D. Nordhaus, "The Recent Productivity  Slow- 
down," BPEA, 3:1972, pp. 493-536;  and George L. Perry, "Potential Output and 
Productivity,"  BPEA, 1:1977, pp. 11-47. Numerous other studies of the manufactur- 
ing sector could be cited; for example, see Christopher  A. Sims, "Output  and Labor 
Input in Manufacturing,"  BPEA, 3:1974, pp. 695-728. 
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paper  makes  no contribution  to an understanding  of the secular  slowdown 
in productivity,  except to add a new cyclical correction  of the long-run 
trend.  Its main  objective  is to examine  the short-run  behavior  of aggregate 
labor  productivity  in isolation.  In addition  to the phenomenon  of short- 
run  "increasing  returns  to labor"  identified  in previous  studies,  it isolates 
an often overlooked  but consistent  tendency  for productivity  to perform 
poorly  in the last stages  of a business  expansion.  In 1956, 1960, 1969, 
1973, and  now again  in 1979, a productivity  shortfall  has developed,  with 
absolute  declines  in the level of productivity  occurring  in every episode 
except  the first,  and  in every  episode  before 1979 the shortfall  has subse- 
quently  been made up. The paper  is more successful  in identifying  this 
"end-of-expansion"  phenomenon  than  in explaining  it; the results  suggest 
that firms  tend consistently  to hire more workers  in the last stages of a 
business  expansion  than  is justified  by the level of output. 
An improved  understanding  of the short-run  behavior  of productivity, 
while  of far less importance  than an unraveling  of the secular  slowdown 
puzzle,  nevertheless  has relevance  for several  issues. Any forecast  of the 
paths  of employment  and unemployment  that accompanies  a given path 
of real  output  over the next few quarters  requires  a decomposition  of re- 
cent  productivity  changes  into  their  permanent  and  transitory  components, 
as does  the early  recognition  of shifts  in the secular  growth  rate  of produc- 
tivity,  and  hence of the likely medium-term  trends  in potential  GNP and 
in the full-employment  government  budget.  Further,  the same decompo- 
sition  is required  for structural  price  equations  that  attempt  to explain  the 
extent  to which  firms  respond  to changes  in actual  labor productivity  by 
altering  prices  rather  than  profits.3 
Alteniative  Specifications  of the Short-Run  Productivity  Relationship 
Previous  work  by Nordhaus,  Perry,  and others  has modeled  the pro- 
cyclical  fluctuations  in average  labor  productivity  as a partial  adjustment 
3.  My interest in the cyclical behavior of productivity stems originally from the 
need to distinguish  between actual and trend productivity measures for price equa- 
tions. An hours equation similar to those in table 1 was originally presented in a 
previous article. See  Robert J.  Gordon, "Inflation in  Recession and Recovery," 
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of the  ratio  of aggregate  labor  hours  to potential  hours,  H/H*, in response 
to fluctuations  in the ratio  of actual  to potential  real  output,  Q/Q*: 
(1)  sH  Q  0  < 
The assumption  that  the parameter  of adjustment,  ,B,  is less than  unity  can 
be interpreted  as reflecting  the variability  of capital utilization  and the 
fixity  of some  portion  of labor  input.4 
The statistical  estimation  of equation  1 cannot  be done until a proce- 
dure  is developed  to construct  time  series  for potential  hours  and  real  out- 
put. One of the two missing  variables  can be eliminated  if it is assumed 
that "potential  productivity,"  Q*/H*,  grows at the exponential  trend 
rate  g: 
(2)  Q  H*Beat, 
where  B is a constant  term.  Perry's  estimation  procedure  has been to use 
equation  2 to eliminate  Q*, and then to construct  a time series  for poten- 
tial hours.  Nordhaus  used 2 to eliminate  H* and then constructed  a time 
series  for potential  output.  No matter  which  procedure  is chosen,  there  is 
no escape  from  the necessity  to select one or the other  "potential"  series, 
and  thus  to impose  a criterion  for deciding  what  conditions  represent  the 
economy's  "potential." 
Because  I focus in this paper on short-run  adjustment,  I avoid any 
discussion  of problems  involved  in constructing  potential  output  measures 
and  instead  adopt  the series  recently  constructed  by Perloff  and  Wachter.5 
4.  The traditional  explanation of short-run increasing returns to labor is that a 
portion of labor input is fixed because of training and separation costs. The classic 
reference is Walter Y.  Oi, "Labor as a Quasi-Fixed Factor," Joutrnal  of Political 
Economy, vol. 70 (December 1962),  pp. 538-55.  More recently Solow has argued 
that the variable utilization of  capital is  also necessary to  explain the  observed 
facts; see R. M. Solow, "Some Evidence on the Short-Run Productivity Puzzle," in 
Jagdish  Bhagwati  and Richard  S. Eckaus, eds., Development and Planning, Essays in 
Honour of Patul  Rosenstein Rodan (M.I.T. Press, 1973), pp. 316-25. 
5.  Jeffrey M. Perloff and Michael L. Wachter, "A Production Function-Non- 
accelerating  Inflation  Approach to Potential Output: Is Measured Potential Output 
Too High?"  in Karl Brunner  and Allan H. Meltzer,  eds., Three  Aspects of Policy and 
Policymaking: Knowledge, Data and Institutions, Carnegie-Rochester  Conference 
Series on Public Policy, vol. 10 (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979), pp. 113-63. See 
the discussion  following their paper for a number of qualifications  to the procedures 
used by Perloff  and Wachter. 450  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1979 
Substituting  2 into 1 to eliminate  potential  hours,  I obtain 
(3)  H=  (Q  V  Ae-gl, 
where  A is equal  to B-1. Equation  3 can be estimated  directly,  and can be 
made  more  flexible  by allowing  lagged  values  of the output  ratio as well 
as the current  ratio to influence  hours, and by allowing  for several dif- 
ferent  time-trends  to capture  the effect  of the slowdown  in secular  produc- 
tivity  growth. 
The period  examined  here begins  in 1954:3. All regression  equations 
are estimated  through  1977:4, permitting  the use of data for 1978 and 
1979 for an evaluation  of the aspects  of productivity  behavior  in recent 
quarters  that  are  not predicted  by the regressions.  The raw  data  exhibit  the 
much-discussed  slowdown  in secular  growth  rates;  in this paper  the divid- 
ing line initiating  the two kinks  in the secular  trend  occurs  at 1965:4 and 
1972:4.6 The respective  quarterly  growth  rates  for the three  periods,  ex- 
pressed  at annual  rates, are 2.75 percent  for 1954:2 through 1965:4, 
1.96 percent  for 1965:4 through  1972:4, and 0.85 percent  for 1972:4 
through  1979:3. Thus the overall slowdown  between  the first and third 
periods  is 1.87 percentage  points. 
Regression  Equations  Relating  Hours  to Output 
There  is no attempt  here to estimate  the stark and simple version of 
the  hours-adjustment  equation  represented  by 3. Instead,  all the estimates 
differ  from 3 by including  three  lagged output  terms  and allowing  for a 
broken  time-trend.  Rather  than estimate  three separate  time-trends,  all 
equations  (except  those covering  subperiods)  contain  one time-trend  for 
the entire  period,  a second  trend  to measure  the extent  and significance  of 
a slowdown  during  1966:1-1972:4  from the overall trend, and a third 
trend to  measure the extent and significance  of  a slowdown during 
1973:1-1977:4 from  the overall  trend. 
I first  estimated  the equation  using  logs of the levels of both dependent 
6. Experimentation  revealed that the regressions  cannot identify a statistically  sig- 
nificant  slowdown in the 1965-73 period. The 1966:1 breakpoint  was chosen to make 
the results roughly comparable to Norsworthy, Harper, and Kunze, "Slowdown in 
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and independent  variables.7  The results  are not included  in table 1 be- 
cause  a very  low Durbin-Watson  statistic  suggested  the presence  of posi- 
tive serial  correlation.  When the level equation  was reestimated  with a 
Cochrane-Orcutt  correction,  the estimated  first-order  serial correlation 
coefficient  was 0.883, suggesting  that the relation  written  in equation  3 
should  be respecified  with the data expressed  in first differences.  Using 
lowercase  letters  to represent  quarterly  percentage  changes,  the change 
equation  corresponding  to equation  3 is 
(4)  h-q*  =  f(q-q*)  g. 
The basic  first-difference  result  is presented  in column  1 of table 1. An 
interesting  feature  of the equation  is the statistical  insignificance  of the 
1966-72 secular  slowdown.  Indeed,  this weakness  of evidence  supporting 
a slowdown  in the period is a consistent  characteristic  of all the first- 
difference  equations  in this  paper. 
A serious  problem  arises  with  the basic  first-difference  equation  in col- 
umn 1 that is not evident in the summary  statistics  presented  in the 
table.  Although  the Durbin-Watson  statistic for the equation  is 1.73, and 
the Cochrane-Orcutt  estimate  of the first-order  serial correlation  is not 
statistically  significant  at the 5 percent  level, the residuals  of the equation 
display  a distinctively  nonrandom  pattern.  The residuals  tend to be posi- 
tive  for a number  of quarters,  followed  by a "string"  of negative  values: 
Fraction  of residuals of one sign in interval 
Interval  Positive  Negative 
1955:3-1956:4  5/6  ... 
1957: 1-1958:2  ...  4/6 
1958:3-1960:1  5/7  . . 
1961:1-1962:4  ...  7/8 
1965:2-1968:2  ...  9/13 
1968:3-1970:1  7/7  ... 
1970:2-1973:1  ...  10/12 
1973:2-1974:3  6/6 
1974:4-1976:3  ...  7/8 
Thus,  of the ninety-four  observations  in this regression  equation,  seventy- 
three  are  included  in these strings  with uniform  signs.  It is the negatively 
7.  The estimate of potential nonfarm output is equal to the potential series of 
Perloff and Wachter for total real GNP, adjusted for the difference between trend 
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Table  1. Estimates  of Equation  for Aggregate  Hours,  Nonfarm  Business  Sector, 
1954:3-1977:4 and  Subperiods,  and Postsample  Errors  in Predicting  Productivity 
Changea 
Sample  period 
Independent  variable,  1954:3-1977:4  1954:3-  1966:2- 
summary  statistic,  and  1966:1  1977:4 
postsample  error  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Independent  variable 
Timeb 
1954:3-1977:4  -2.  48o  - 2. 47o  -2.  48o  - 2. 48o  ... 
1966-72 slowdown  0.45  0.45  0.46  ...  ...d 
1973-77 slowdown  1.420  1.400  1.420  .  d 
Current  Q/Q*  0.4230  0.4500  0.4570  0.4970  0.4150 
Lagged  Q/Q* 
One quarter  0.2660  0.2690  0.2700  0.2170  0.3230 
Two quarters  0.1000  0.0870  0.0880  0.1110  0.073 
Three  quarters  0.024  -0.034  -0.040  -0.047  -0.033 
Sum of coefficients  on Q/Q*  0.8130  0.7720  0.7750  0.7780  0.7780 
End-of-expansion  effect 
1954:3-1977:4  ...  2.22c  1.800  1.570  2.290 
(5.65)  (4.23)  (3.21)  (2.66) 
Additional  post-1973:  1 effect  ...  ...  2.010  ...  1.41 
(2.31)  (1.22) 
Summary  statistic 
R2  0.75  0.82  0.83  0.85  0.82 
Standard  error  of estimatee  0.49  0.42  0.41  0.40  0.44 
Durbin-Watson  1.73  2.13  2.27  2.33  2.14 
Postsamnple  prediction  error, 
cumulative  change  in 
productivity 
1977:4-1978:4  -0.50  -0.52  -0.49  ...  -0.55 
1978:4-1979:3  -  1.55  -0.70  0.54  ...  0.28 
1977:4-1979:3  -2.05  -1.22  0.05  ...  -0.27 
Sources: Quarteriy  hours and output data for the nonfarm business sector are from the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. Potential real GNP for the nonfarm business sector was obtained by applying a quLarterly 
trend adjustment to the series provided by Jeffrey M. Perloff and Michael L. Wachter. See text note 7. 
The dummy variable representing  the end-of-expansion effect is descriibed  in the text. 
a. The dependent  variable  is the ratio of aggregate hours to potential real GNP for the nonfarm businiess 
sector. The dependent  variable  and the current  and lagged values of the ratio of real GNP to potential  GNP, 
Q /Q*,  are expressed  as quarterly  rates of growth. The numbers in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
b. The estimated  annual trend rate of growth in productivity  is given by the negative of these coefficients 
summed to the period Indicated. Up to  1966, the coefficient for the entire sample applies; in  1966-72, it 
is that plus the coefficient  for 1966-72; and in 1973-77, it is the coefficient for the entire sample plus the 
coefficient  for 1973-77. 
c.  Significant  at the 5 percent level. 
d. The equation for the second subperiod in column 5 includes two constant terms to capture the trend 
rates of growth. The estimated trends are -2.00  percent a year for  1966-72 and  -1.08  percent a year 
thereafter. 
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correlated  zig-zag pattern of the remaining  residuals that keeps the 
Durbin-Watson  statistic  from  accurately  revealing  the nature  of the serial 
correlation  problem  in this  equation. 
This pattern  of autocorrelation  poses  two interesting  questions  that are 
relevant  to an improved  understanding  of recent short-run  productivity 
fluctuations.  First, can the pattern  of residuals  be explained  by the be- 
havior  of some set of economic  variables  over  time?  Second,  if the pattern 
of residuals  cannot  be explained  statistically,  can it be described  in any 
useful or interesting  way? 
Initially  I assumed  that it would  be possible  to explain  the pattern  of 
the residuals  by some autoregressive  process.  For instance,  if an inertial 
process  in hiring  caused  a firm  to base hiring  plans of the current  period 
on the outconle  of the last period,  one would expect a significant  role to 
be played by lagged dependent  variables.  To test this hypothesis,  four 
lagged  values  of the dependent  variable  were  added  to column  1 and  every 
other  equation  presented  in table 1. In no case was any lagged  dependent 
variable  significant,  even  at the 10 percent  level. Another  supposition  was 
that firms  might make systematic  errors  in predicting  output by basing 
their expectations  on an overly long moving average  of past changes  in 
output.  But the addition  of further  lagged  values of output  to the equa- 
tions in the table makes  no important  contribution,  except to pick up a 
seasonal  pattern.8  These  negative  findings  apply  not only to the equations 
estimated  for the full sample  period,  but also to equations  estimated  sepa- 
rately  for  the first  and  second  half  of that  period. 
Specification  of the 'End-of-Expansion"  Effect 
Although  it does  not appear  possible  to explain  the mysterious  residuals 
in any  conventional  sense,  they  can  be "characterized"  in an appealing  and 
interesting  way. Let the last phase of the business  cycle expansion  begin 
when  the ratio  of real  GNP  to potential  real  GNP, Q/Q*, reaches  its peak. 
Until that time, real output  has been rising  faster  than  its long-run  trend, 
8.  Estimates of the equations with eight lagged output terms were presented to 
the Brookings panel, and several participants  commented that the significant  zig-zag 
pattern of the weights on lags four and five might be a reflection  of seasonality in the 
underlying data. As many as sixteen lags were also included with no improvement  in 
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and  thus  business  firms  may  have  discovered  that  their  real  sales  have  out- 
stripped  their  previous  plans  and  expectations,  requiring  upward  revisions 
of plans  for both hiring  and capital  investment.  Managers  of individual 
firms,  each buoyed  by a series  of quarters  when  business  was better  than 
expected,  may feel justified  in extrapolating  this performance  into the 
future.  Given  the economy's  limited  capacity  to produce,  the realization  of 
each of their  plans in some episodes  would have required  that each firm 
simultaneously  raise  its market  share. 
A dummy  variable  can be created  that captures  this end-of-expansion 
effect.  Each  episode  of overhiring  is constrained  to commence  in the quar- 
ter  after  the peak  quarter  of Q/Q*, which  for the five  business  cycles  since 
1954:2 has occurred  in 1955:4, 1959:2, 1968:3, 1973: 1, and 1978:4.9 
Because  it is assumed  that managers  eventually  recognize  that they have 
too many employees  on the payroll and take corrective  measures,  the 
dummy  variable  is constructed  to take  positive  values  for M quarters  fol- 
lowing  the quarters  when Q/Q* reaches  its peak, and thereafter  to take 
negative  values  for N quarters.  The variable  is constrained  to sum  to zero 
over  any  given  business  cycle, and  thus  does not distort  the meaning  of the 
secular  trend  coefficients  in the hours  equations.  An additional  constraint 
is imposed  by setting  the values  of M and  N equal  to the same  number  for 
each  cycle: six quarters  for the M, eight  quarters  for N.10  The larger  value 
of N reflects  the tendency  of firms  to take their corrective  action over a 
longer  period  than the time taken  for the overstaffing  problem  to occur. 
Column  2 in table 1 illustrates  the effect  of adding  the "end-of-expan- 
sion" (EOE) dummy  variable  to the equation  in column 1. The dummy 
variable  is extremely  significant  statistically,  with a t-statistic  of 5.65.11 
The variable  is defined  so that  its coefficient  indicates  the cumulative  per- 
centage  amount  of overhiring  that occurred  on average  over all cycles; 
during  the six quarters  of overhiring  (M =  6) hours  reached  a level 2.22 
percent  higher  than  can  be explained  by the  behavior  of current  and  lagged 
9. To date, the National Bureau of Economic Research has not yet declared the 
existence of a recession in 1979. Nevertheless, it seems likely that a recession will 
begin late in 1979 or early in 1980, and that in retrospect 1978:4 will represent  the 
peak in Q/Q*. The three quarters  of 1979 all had Q/Q* values significantly  below 
that in 1978:4. 
10. The only exception to the statement made in the text is that, reflecting the 
shorter  and sharper  business  cycle for the mid-1950s, M= 4 and N = 6 for the period 
beginning  with the Q/Q* peak in 1955:4. 
11. Exact values of t-statistics  are shown in table 1 only for the EOE variables; 
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output,  and  this excess  of 2.22 percentage  points  was gradually  eliminated 
over the subsequent eight quarters (N  =  8).12  Note that the estimates of 
the coefficients  on secular  trends  are  virtually  unaffected  by the introduc- 
tion of the EOE variable  in column  2. The sum  of the coefficients  on cur- 
rent and lagged output  is about  the same in both columns 1 and 2 and 
indicates  only a partial  response  of hours,  the effect  known  as short-run 
increasing  returns  to labor.  Thus  the fitted  coefficients  in equation  2 com- 
bine the traditional  procyclical  fluctuations  in labor  productivity  together 
with an indication  of unusual  weakness  in the last stage of the business 
expansion. 
Several additional  equations  are presented  in table 1 to determine 
whether  the significance  of the EOE effect  is attributable  to a particular 
business  cycle, or rather  reflects  a phenomenon  that  operates  during  each 
cycle. Column  3 is identical  to column  2 but allows  a separate  value  of the 
EOE variable  to enter  after  1973:  1. The coefficient  on this  variable  would 
be zero if the behavior  of productivity  during  the 1973-74 episode  were 
the same as the average  of the previous  cycles, and would be positive  if 
there  were  a greater  tendency  toward  excess  staffing  and  slack  productivity 
in that episode.  It is apparent  that the 1973-74 episode  was unusual  be- 
cause  it had a cumulative  excess  hiring  of 2.01 percentage  points  over the 
"normal"  EOE effect  of 1.80 percent,  for a total of 3.81 percent.  Despite 
this feature  of the 1973-74 period, the coefficient  on the overall EOE 
effect  drops  only slightly  in moving  from  column  2 to 3, and  its t-statistic 
is still a robust  4.23. 
Columns  4 and  5 of table 1 report  the results  obtained  when  the sample 
period is divided,  with separate  estimates  for the 1954:3-1966:1  and 
1966:2-1977:4 periods.  The  results  for the divided  sample  make  the 1974 
episode look less unusual.  In column  5 the coefficient  on the additional 
1973-74 EOE effect  is reduced  to 1.41 percent,  with a t-statistic  of only 
1.22, which  is below  the 10 percent  level of significance.  Despite  the isola- 
tion of the 1968-69  and the 1973-74  periods in column 5, there still 
seems to be a significant  end-of-expansion  effect  in column  4 for the first 
half of the sample  period.  The productivity  slump  of 1956 has long stood 
as evidence that the simple procyclical story of equation 1 is an in- 
complete  representation  of the short-run  behavior  of productivity;  a simi- 
lar cessation  in productivity  growth  occurred  in the next business  cycle 
12. For example, the dummy variable is defined as one-sixth for tlle first six 
quarters  following 1968:3 and as minus one-eighth  for the subsequent  eight quarters. 456  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1979 
expansion  after the Q/Q* peak was reached  in 1959:2. The excellent 
performance  of productivity  during  the first  two years  of the Kennedy  ad- 
ministration  can thus  be partly  explained  through  the normal  working  of 
the "rebound"  phase  of the end-of-expansion  effect. 
Attempting  to Explain  the End-of-Expansion  Effect 
Thus far I have only described  the end-of-expansion  effect, without 
providing  any behavioral  explanation  of its origins.  To address  the ques- 
tion of how much  of the sluggish  response  of aggregate  hours at the end 
of business expansions  comes from employment  and how much from 
hours  per employee  (HPE), separate  regression  equations  were  estimated 
corresponding  to each column  of table 1 in which  employment  and HPE 
alternatively  replaced  aggregate  hours  as the  dependent  variable.  Of a total 
EOE effect  of 1.80 percentage  points (corresponding  to the equation  for 
the entire  period  in column  3 of table 1), 1.26 points are contributed  by 
employment  and  0.54 point  by HPE. Thus  it would appear  that the EOE 
phenomenon  primarily  involves  the maintenance  of an excessive  number 
of employees  relative  to output,  with  hours  per employee  making  a minor 
additional  contribution.'3 
Several  suggestions  have been made to explain  the EOE phenomenon 
as being consistent  with rational  profit-maximizing  behavior.  One is that 
labor  and  capital  may  be interdependent  factors  of production.  In periods 
when capital  investment  is relatively  high, additional  employees  may be 
required  to install  new equipment,  and experienced  employees  may have 
to work  overtime  to train  new employees.  These "installation  costs"  de- 
crease  when investment  is low. To test this proposition,  the detrended 
ratio  of fixed  nonresidential  investment  to potential  GNP  was entered  into 
the basic equation (column 3)  in the form of both its level and first 
difference.  The t-statistics  were  minuscule,  and  the size of the EOE coeffi- 
cients  was  not affected. 
A second suggestion  is that firms  maintain  some slack in their labor 
force when the quit rate is high to guard against being caught short- 
13. A further indication that most of the EOE effect stems from employment 
rather than from HPE is the high t-statistic of 3.89 on the EOE variable in the em- 
ployment equation, as opposed to  one of  only  1.17 in the HPE equation. After 
1973:1, employment and HPE each make an equal contribution of  about 1 per- 
centage point, with t-statistics  that are marginally significant  at the 10 percent level. 
Similar  results  were obtained  when equations  were run for the two subperiods. Robert  J. Gordon  457 
handed.  This slack subsequently  disappears  during  periods  when  the quit 
rate is low and firms  no longer are concerned  that key employees  may 
depart.  Both  the level and  first  difference  of the quit  rate  in manufacturing 
were  added  to the basic  equation  in column  3 with  the same  negative  out- 
come as that of investment;  t-statistics  were below the margin  of signifi- 
cance,  while  the  EOE  coefficients  were  unaffected. 
A final  set of tests investigated  the statistical  legitimacy  of the form of 
the equations  in table 1. In principle,  the relationship  between  output  and 
hours  could  be tested  with either  hours  or output  on the left-hand  side of 
the equation  to be estimated.  Following the procedure  employed by 
Christopher  A. Sims  in his previous  investigation  of manufacturing  pro- 
ductivity,  an alternative  equation  was estimated  with the rate of change 
of output  on the left, and  leading  as well as current  and  lagged  changes  in 
hours  on the right."4  A symmetric  equation  was estimated  that adds  lead- 
ing values  of output  change  to column  3 of table 1. The results  are com- 
pletely  consistent  with the view that output  is exogenous  with respect  to 
hours;  leading  values  of hours  had large  and significant  coefficients  in the 
output  equation,  but  leading  values  of output  had  insignificant  coefficients 
in the hours  equation.  A satisfying  feature  of this additional  set of tests  is 
that the EOE variables  are strongly  significant  (and of course  with the 
opposite  sign) when the relationship  is estimated  with output  change  as 
the dependent  variable.15 
Interpreting  the 1978-79 Productivity  Performance 
The last three  rows  of table 1 list the postsample  extrapolations  of the 
equations.  All equations  except  that  in column  3 predict  a growth  rate  of 
14. For additional  discussion of the interpretation  of these techniques,  see Sims, 
"Output  and Labor Input in Manufacturing."  In my tests only two leading quarterly 
values were included,  in contrast to the larger number of leading values included in 
Sims' study of monthly data. The only significant coefficient on a leading value of 
output  in the hours equation  occurred  with a two-quarter  lead, but the coefficient  had 
a negative sign. 
15. George Perry  has inquired  whether the EOE effect might be explained in part 
by the cyclical mix of  output. One would expect productivity growth to fall and 
employment to appear too large in years when the output of industries with high 
productivity  like automobiles  is falling. While declining automobile sales may be part 
of the problem  in 1973-74, the timing is wrong in earlier cycles. For instance, auto 
sales fell sharply between 1965 and 1966-67  and between 1969 and 1970, yet the 
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hours  during  1978-79 (last row) that  is smaller  than  the actual  outcome, 
and thus a higher  level of productivity  than has actually  occurred.  The 
forecast  errors  become  successively  smaller  as one moves from  column 1 
to column  3, and the error  remains  small  in column  5. The equations  in 
columns  3 and  5, which  include  the post-1973: 1 dummy,  predict  a larger 
decline  in productivity  for the 1978:4-1979:3  period than has actually 
occurred.  The ability  of these  equations  to "track"  the precipitous  decline 
in the level of productivity  during  the first  half of 1979 results  from the 
impact  of the EOE effect (which first  takes  place in 1979: 1), as well as 
from  the fact  that,  in those  predictions,  the additional  1973-74 effect  also 
applies to 1979.16 
In figure  1 the actual  values of the level of nonfarm  productivity  be- 
tween  1967 and 1979 are  compared  with  the predictions  of levels implied 
by the fitted  values  of two equations  for the growth  rate  of productivity- 
the simple equation presented  in column 1, table 1, reestimated  for 
the 1966-77 period and shown as the dotted line, and the equation  in 
column  5 incorporating  the EOE effect  that was estimated  for the same 
sample  period  and  shown  as the dashed  line. A comparison  of the dashed 
and  dotted  lines illustrates  the role of the EOE effect  in improving  the ex- 
planation  of the absolute  decline  in productivity  in 1969 and 1973-74, as 
well as the subsequent  rebound in 1970-72  and 1975-76.  The post- 
sample  extrapolation  of the dashed  line also captures  the decline  in pro- 
ductivity  during  the first  half of 1979, although  its level is between  one- 
half and  one percentage  point  too high  throughout  1977, 1978, and 1979, 
suggesting  that a third  slowdown  in the secular  trend  may have begun  in 
early  1977. 
Implications  of the results 
The coefficients  of dummy  variables  in regression  equations  cannot 
explain puzzling phenomena,  but they help to  identify and describe 
some  interesting  features  of economic  behavior.  In previous  work  I tested 
the significance  of dummy  variables  for the 1971-74 price controls  and 
subsequent  postcontrols  rebound  as an aid in describing  U.S. price be- 
havior,  and "wage-pusoh"  dummy  variables  in wage equations  for various 
16. Even the unadorned  first-difference  equation in column 1 predicts  an absolute 
decline in productivity  during the first half of  1979 because of the impact of rapid 
growth of output in 1978 on hiring in 1979 through the lagged output terms. Robert  J. Gordon  459 
Figure  1. Output  per Hour in the Nonfarm  Business  Sector, Actual  and Predicted  from 
Alternative  Equations,  1967:2-1979:31 
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1 and 5 of table 1, with the column 1 equation reestimated  for the 1966-77 period. 
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European countries.17  In each case, an external event could be identified 
by contemporary accounts to  help date and describe the phenomenon 
captured by the dummy variables. In this paper, the end-of-expansion 
dummy variables  are  statistically  significant and  operate  consistently 
across business cycles, but their interpretation is more conjectural. My 
conjecture is that the phenomenon stems from mistaken expectations and 
from inertia in changing personnel budgets. Although no direct evidence 
is presented here that misperceptions actually occurred, the data are con- 
sistent with my imposed constraint that the dummy variable sums to zero, 
thus forcing any end-of-expansion overstaffing to be eliminated in subse- 
quent periods. 
One might liken the EOE effect to other phenomena in economic time- 
series involving overshooting-including  booms in the stock market and 
overbuilding in the commercial construction industry. Yet  at a deeper 
level, these two examples of overshooting are different in nature. Partici- 
pants in the stock market deal in an auction market in which there is no 
inertia beyond the expectations of other market participants to limit price 
movements, and no external guidepost exists to indicate a "correct" level 
of prices. Expectations in September 1929 were incorrect only ex post and 
did not appear so at the time. In commercial construction, however, over- 
building may result from the long lags between decisionmaking and project 
completion, imparting an inertia to the time-series on nonresidential con- 
struction that is familiar to students of business cycles. The end-of-expan- 
sion phenomenon of overstaffing may result from a similar lag between 
business decisions that set personnel budgets and the actual hiring, train- 
ing, and promotions. Business firms may not be irrational or even guilty 
of mistaken expectations at the time that the personnel budgets are set. 
Rather, they may gradually recognize an overstaffing condition but be 
unable to correct it rapidly because of both the high costs of more fre- 
quent decisionmaking and the inevitable time it takes to prune the work 
force purely by attrition when layoffs are costly. 
At the more immediate level of current policy discussions, the results 
in this paper suggest that standard equations may tend regularly to over- 
predict productivity growth during the interval following the cyclical peak 
in the ratio of actual to potential output. A corollary is the tendency for 
17. See Robert  J. Gordon, "Can  the Inflation  of the 1970s be Explained?"  BPEA, 
1:1977, pp. 253-77,  and "World Inflation and Monetary Accommodation in Eight 
Countries,"  BPEA, 2:1977, pp. 409-68. Robert  J. Gordon  461 
simple versions  of  "Okun's law" to fail to  explain why unemployment 
remains so low and employment so high at the end of expansions and the 
beginning of contractions.18  Thus current  forecasts based on conventional 
productivity equations may be unduly pessimistic about the increase in 
unemployment that will occur during late 1979 and early 1980, but overly 
optimistic for subsequent periods. 
Discussion 
BOTH  William Poole and Robert Hall pointed out that an "end-of-expan- 
sion" effect could only characterize the data ex post.  Tnat effect could 
not characterize the decision process of businesses in hiring, however, be- 
cause businesses could not know the expansion was ending. Hall reasoned 
that lags in the hiring process must lie  at the heart of  the productivity 
shortfalls that Robert Gordon identifies. 
Charles Holt  asked for more work on the theoretical aspects of  the 
hiring and employment process that might explain Gordon's productivity 
variables. He reasoned that high turnover rates could cut into productivity 
because they required more training and on-the-job  learning and also 
because  they led employers to keep  a larger buffer of  workers on  the 
payroll  and made it more difficult for them to  correct hiring mistakes 
because layoffs were low. Such a process might fruitfully be tested more 
thoroughly than Gordon had been able to do in this paper. Lacking any 
convincing explanation for the dummy variables in the regressions, sev- 
eral participants, and Gordon himself, emphasized that those variables 
describe an interesting phenomenon rather  than explain it. 
18. Arthur Okun is well aware of this problem and in fact has explained the low 
level of unemployment  in 1974 in these terms: "I believe that the principal  explana- 
tion lies in the momentum and overoptimism  of personnel policies." See Arthur M. 
Okun, "Unemployment  and Output  in 1974,"  BPEA, 2:1974, p. 503. 